

Number, - 8th Case.

Attack on Halifax
and
Adjacent Territory.

Expedition to Attack
Halifax
and

Interrupt Enemy's Communications.

The third committee, in connection with the solution of the Problem asks to submit the following:

To harass the enemy's garrison & ascend at Halifax, to interrupt the line of communication with that point and the scene of operation against our coast, to destroy R.R., to destroy railroads in adjacent districts, to destroy the means of operating the coal mines in the county of Pictou, we would suggest an expeditionary force of not less than ten thousand (10,000.) men, including infantry, artillery, cavalry, one company engineers, with necessary transportation, and with as few losses as possible, consistent with efficiency.

2 The Division should consist of: two brigades, one squadron of cavalry, three battalions of artillery and one company of engineers, a total strength of 10,059 men of all ranks.

The gross tonnage for the transportation of this division is as follows:

	Tons
For 10,059 officers and men	22,633.
" 600 draught animals	<u>6,000.</u>
	28,633.

" Casualties, & replace disabled stores.	
and for towing, floating repair shops &c. ^{10%}	<u>2,863</u>
Total tonnage	31,496.

This tonnage is found in the following list of vessels, taken from the Lloyds Register.

	<u>Gross Tonnage.</u>
1 "City of Breckton"	2,771.
2 City of Tanton.	2,722.

3	3 City of Para	3,532.
		1,490.
4	4 City of Panama	
		1,878.
5	5 City of Columbia	
6	6 City of Rio de Janeiro	3,548.
7	7 City of Washington	2,635.
8	8 City of San Antonio	1,605.
9	9 City of Swansea	2,029.
10	10 Chatahouchee	2,676.
11	11 Chalmotte	2,988.
12	12 H. F. Dimick	1,786.
13	13 Herman Winter	1,769.
14	14 Old Dominion	1,776.
15	15 Seneca	1,912.
16	16 Wynote	<u>1,660.</u>

The above tonnage with 36,982.

a convey. from the main flat, not less than 8 courses, 4 R. + 2 D., 2 gumbrets, Jaktum clare, and

4 6 torpedo boats would be adequate to transport, convey, disembark & defend landing of the division.

The points of embarkation should be at least three, if practicable, and Boston, Portsmouth and Portland are convenient and suitable places; an allotment of tonnage being made in keeping with the individual facilities at these points.

Portsmouth is selected on account of the Navy Yard facilities, and an appropriate plan to fit a repair ship; Boston on account of its protected harbor and water frontage & wharves; Portland would accommodate a smaller tonnage, but has great depth of water and is near the point of

5 rendezvous, the mouth of the Truckee River. All these points have good railway facilities, a maritime population + shipwrights, besides many other skilled mechanics, to draw upon.

The troops should come, preferably, from New England, not only to save transportation, but would then be more or less familiar with the coast and country in which they embark.

The destination of this force should be kept a profound secret, and the moment hostilities are decided upon all possible means of ascertaining the condition of the objective should be resorted to.

To obtain this information a body of

6. astute, intelligent men should be selected to comprise a scout service, and placed in charge of an office familiar with each work. Such a man could be readily selected from the detective forces of our large cities.

The force being embarked should assemble off the mouth of the Penobscot River, and then await instructions. The weather conditions which would probably exist at this time, the late autumn, at this point on the coast, would be cold weather, with to fresh N. to N. W. winds.

The moment the main body of the enemy's fleet & transports had sailed from Halifax, and our beyond signal communication work

7 The Nova Scotia shore. The expedition
should sail for St. Margarets Bay,
the first harbor to the W. of Halifax.
This distance is 310 R. and with
a sea speed of 8.5 knots should
be covered in time to effect an
entrance to the Bay at early day-
light.

It is assumed that the overland
telegraph line has been seized by
the military authorities, and also the
three (3) submarine cables for Mass. (2)
& N. H. (1), to Nova Scotia.

St. Margarets' Bay is selected
because, the best information obtainable
seems to show, it is not fortified,
and by a hasty move no time
would be allowed to fortify it.
It is less than 20 miles by
each of two

8 main roadways for Halifax,
which is said not to be so heavily
fortified on the land side as
open the sea. Supplies and repair
is easy, the entrance being 2 miles wide,
sufficient sea room in case of fog
or storms, is well sheltered, good
anchorage and it contains a
number of islands useful for a
variety of purposes, such as
hospitals &c. &c. The Bay is 9
miles long, maximum width 3 miles
giving a shore line of 25 miles.

Apparently the beaches are practicable
for landing, and the landing could
be easily covered.

The flat of transports over at
anchor in the Bay the entrance
should be carefully guarded by

9 the enemy, and the torpedo boats
be in readiness to attack

The landings, as many as
possible, being covered the landing
should commence at once and be
continued uninterruptedly until com-
pleted. The men should be
supplied with 2 days' cooked
rations, ^{and ample ammunition.} and also all winter
foot-gear or snow & frost are
likely to be encountered at this season.

If nothing prevents the movement
should commence in force as soon
as possible, and by as many ap-
proaches as can be found available.
Communication with the fleet and
base must be carefully maintained
both by signal stations & telegraph
or telephone lines.

10 The details of the unloading and
loading have been so fully touched
upon during the course that they are
omitted here. We deem it sufficient
to say that the transport have
been adequately provided with boats,
and barges for the landing of men,
animals and supplies. That
everything has been placed in
readiness to make a hasty embarka-
tion in case of defeat or, the suc-
cess of the expedition having been
accomplished, the force ordered to re-embark.

The estimate of tonnage and
supplies contemplate an absence from
the base ports not to exceed
ten (10) days.

Following the occupation of the
highways, the garrison of Holyoak

11 must be confined to the limits of
its work. Railing parties should
stand in force to Pitou overcome
any resistance offered, and explode
in the coal mines of Pitou heavy
charges to destroy the shafts,
and tunnels, and render the mines
incapable of being worked; the
trucks and all inflammable
material should be put to the torch;
the hoisting and transporting machinery
be destroyed or injured beyond repair.
This accomplished the street should
be along the line of railways to
the main body, destroying the R. R.
as soon as possible, by burning
or wrecking bridges, culverts, hoisting
and binding the rails, & other devices
so frequently practiced during the late

12 civil war.

If the assault of Halifax on the land side is found impracticable the force must be embarked & return with despatch to the plan of operations.

During the absence of the division the II ships and gunboats should endeavor to intercept, despatch vessels, coal & supply steamers of the enemy, plying between Halifax and the main fleet of the enemy operating on our coast.

The raiding party, in force, upon the Pictou mines must start at the earliest moment practicable, in order to cover the distance, 70 miles, and return within the limited time allowed, and also to make the raid as much of a surprise as possible.

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Instructions to the 4th Det of 16
Transports and 8 armed vessels
comprising the convoy.

The formation will be the "square"
with steamers carrying wagons to the
rear, to assist by towing, or otherwise,
any disabled transports.

Two C's in the van, 2 C's on
the flanks, 2 gunboats to the rear
while the 2 I's should act as scouts.

In case of separation the rendezvous will
be the destination as originally arranged,
if for any reason vessels are unable to reach
that point they will return to the most
available home port.

The commander-in-chief will
make such arrangements to secure

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information while at sea as to enable him to be overtaken by important despatches, that might render it advisable to change the destination of the expedition, or order the enterprise to be abandoned.

For this purpose swift class B vessels could bear with despatches from ports on the coast of Maine in telegraphic communication with the officials in authority.

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